Die Verfasser setzen sich mit dem chinesischen Unternehmensmodell des Dorfunternehmens (Township-village enterprise, TVE) auseinander. Eigentümer der TVEs sind lokale Bürger, während die Kontrolle in den Händen der Lokalregierung liegt. Die Erträge werden zwischen Bürgern und Beamten...

Using a data set that traces the ten-year history of 80 Chinese rural enterprises, known as township and village enterprises, we study the implications of introducing managerial incentives and better-defined ownership for a firm's financial performance. During this period, these mostly...

Following a suggestion of Easterbrook (1984), the incentive role of new security offerings is studied in the agency model with a costly signal. We identify conditions under which the optimal contract contingent on the signal can be achieved by a mechanism that involves the monitoring of a third...