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Transfers to Sustain Core-Theoric Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control.

Germain, M.; Toint, P.; Tulkens, H.; de Zeeuw A. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1998

International environmental agreements aiming at correcting negative externalities generated by transboundary pollution are difficult to achieve for many reasons. Important obstacles arise from asymmetry in costs and benefits, and instability may occur due to the fact that coalitions of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634145

Constraining Equitable Allocations of Tradable Greenhouse Gases Emission Quotas by Acceptability.

Germain, M.; Van Steenberghe, V. - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 2001

Allocations of tradable greenhouse gases (GHG) emission quotas among countries may take place according to several sharing rules corresponding to a certain perception of equity. For instance, allocating quotas in direct proportion to population, in inverse relation to GDP or according to past...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634217

Complementarity, Substituability and Capital Accumulation

Figuieres, C. - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative … - 1998

The preemptive role of capital is analysed in a class of two-player symmetric capital accumulation differential games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005479037

Shocks and Business Cycles.

Frankel, D.M. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 2001

A popular theory of business cycles is that they are driven by animal spirits: shifts in expectations brought on by sunspots. Two prominent examples are Diamond (JPE, 1982) and Howitt and McAfee (AER, 1992). We show that these models have unique equilibria if there are payoff shocks of any size....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783637

Perfection and Stability of Stationary Points with Applications to Noncooperative Games

van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf; Yang, Zaifu - 2002

Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for every game. In symmetric bimatrix games, our results imply the existence of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324999

Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games

Weibull, Jörgen W. - 1997

evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335048

An empirical model of non-equilibrium behavior in games

Kline, Brendan - In: Quantitative Economics 9 (2018) 1, pp. 141-181

actions in games, based on a structural econo- metric model of non-equilibrium behavior in games. The model is based pri …-player guessing games. The application illustrates the empirical relevance of the main features of the model. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011995514

Are strategies anchored?

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula - 2019

Anchoring is one of the most studied and robust behavioral biases, but there is little knowledge about its persistence in strategic settings. This article studies the role of anchoring bias in private-value auctions. We test experimentally two different anchor types. The announcement of a random...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290342

Anchored strategic reasoning

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula - 2022

toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013197554

Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games

Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - 2005

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312355