Prime objects of this note are (I) excess demand generated by price-taking economic agents, and (II) an alternative version of tatonnement. We relate laws of demand, axioms of revealed preferences, and other notions of generalized monotonicity to evolutionary stable prices. Focus is on local...

A standard approach to duality in stochastic optimization problems with constraints in L(infinite) relies upon the Yosida-Hewitt theorem. We develop an alternative technique which employs only "elementary" means. The technique is based on an e-regularization of the original problem and on...

Motivated by non-cooperative games we study repeated interaction among non-communicating agents, each dealing with his black of variables, each moving merely on the bases of his marginal payoff and its most recent change. Adjustment of play thus unfolds in parallel. Constrants are accommodated....

We model repeated play of noncooperative stage games in terms of approximate gradient steps. That simple format require little information and no optimization. Moreover, it allows players to evaluate marginal cost or profit inexactly and to move with different velocities. Uncertainty can also be...

Accomodated here is a measure space of economic agents, each regarded as a profit maximizing producer, each endowed with his technology and resource bundle. Pooling of private endowments generates a cooperative game with side payments.

We provide a new and simple convergence analysis for fictitious play of two-person, two-strategy games. Some generalizations are also given.

This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium.

This note deals with on-line computatin of learning of Pareto optimal insurance contracts. We account for the fact that the loss distribution often is unknown, unavailable, or intractable. Alternatively, the contracting parties could be inexperienced. In both cases losses must be simulated of...

The main objects here are two-stage games in which players first compete and subsequently collaborate. We consider instances where second-stage collaboration is anticipated and sustained in terms of core solutions.

Numerous economic problems assume the form of finding a fixed point of a continuous self-mapping on a compact interval. We consider instances where the mapping is a parametrized expected value, and we offer an iterative scheme for locating a fixed point. The proposed method can be seen as an...