I examine the Bayesian foundations of game theory and advance three main theses: (i) that if Bayesianism is to be used in game theory, then simpler versions of it are methodologically preferable to the more sophisticated ones; (ii) that it is dubious whether the Savage (or Anscombe and Aumann)...

We study an extension of the standard rationing problem, consisting of the allocation of utility losses. We assume neither linearly transferable utilities nor risk averse agents. As a consequence, the utility possibility sets need not be convex or smooth. This problem is referred to as the...

We propose a novel approach to modelling time preferences, based on a cognitive shortcoming of human decision makers: the perception of future events becomes increasingly `blurred' as the events are pushed further in time. Our model explains behavioural `anomalies' such as preference reversal...

Nash (1950) considered a domain of convex bargaining problems. We analyse domains including, or even consisting of, finite problems and provide various characterisations of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In particular, we extend Kaneko's (1980) results.

The Nash Bargaining Solution is characterised by using the new axiom of Maximal Symmetry in place of Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Symmetry. This axiom expresses the idea that a fair arbitrator should treat symmetric alternatives in the same way, subject to the feasibility...

Collective choice problems on sets in <InlineEquation ID="Equ1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX"> ${\frak R}_+^n$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> arise naturally in economics. Such problems have been extensively studied both in the theory of revealed preferences (Peters and Wakker, 1991) and in axiomatic bargaining theory under the assumption of convexity. However, our knowledge of...</equationsource></inlineequation>

In this paper we formulate and investigate experimentally a model of how individuals choose between time sequences of monetary outcomes. The theoretical model assumes that a decision-maker uses, sequentially, two criteria to screen options. Each criterion only permits a decision between some...

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when unconstrained transfers are possible only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that...