A number of recent theoretical papers have shown that for buyer-size discounts to emerge in a bargaining model, the total surplus function over which parties bargain must have certain nonlinearities. We test the theory in an experimental setting in which a seller bargains with a number of buyers...

This paper uses unique survey-based data that record the extent of positive and negative disequibrium in capital stock at industry level. We observe movement in this disequilibrium and model it to take account of long-run plans, short-term revisions to expectations, and the influence of...

This note shows that the testability result obtained by Brown and Matzkin (1996) for an exchange economy survives the introduction of standard, aggregate production, even without the observation of production levels.

A firm must decide whether to launch a new product. A launch implies considerable fixed costs, so the firm would like to assess downstream demand before it decides. We study under which conditions a potential buyer would be willing to reveal his willingness to pay under different pricing...

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the allocation of the US federal budget to the states. We find that the president has a strong influence on the budget allocation, while support for theories that give prominence to the Congress is rather weak. Membership of prestige...

This paper argues that Blomberg and Hess's ({\it Journal of International Economics 1997}) finding that political variables can be used to predict exchange rate movements better than the random walk model must be seen in the context of the decade and half of previous research which failed to...

We study the effect of cultural differences on contributions in a public good experiment, analysing real-time interactions between Italian and British subjects in their home countries. In the first treatment, subjects play in nationally-homogeneous groups. In the second treatment, Italian and...

In this paper we model the interaction between parties and candidates to highlight the mechanisms by which parties selecting candidates may discipline legislators. The selection of candidates happens by majority voting of party members. We assume a multidimentional policy space comprising an...

In this paper we show how the signalling effect of debt described by Ross (1977) does not work in an environment of hostile takeovers. This is because the effect of debt is to concentrate voting rights in the hands of the incumbent management, "jamming" the signal and preventing any...

Firms and environmental NGO's contest regulatory, legal and other Decisions in a variety of fora including law courts, administrative tribunals and the media. Environmental advocacy in the 1990's is big business, yet its organisation has been little studied. How can NGO's with differing...