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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826710
We analyze relative performance of stochastic and deterministic mechanisms in an environment that has been extensively studied in the literature on communication (e.g., [Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel, Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50 (6) (1982) 1431-1451]) and optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005005904
We study a two-period moral hazard problem with risk-neutral and wealth-constrained agents and three identical tasks. We show that the allocation of tasks over time is important if there is a capacity constraint on the number of tasks that can be performed in one period. We characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067477
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596772
We study the effect of disclosure on information acquisition and transmission in a dynamic reputation model. In each period, to make a report to a client, an expert chooses between conducting a costly investigation or channeling a message from an interest group. We show that not disclosing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008517595
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005159774
People often see the same evidence but draw opposite conclusions, becoming polarized over time. More surprisingly, disagreements persist even when they are commonly known. We derive a model and present an experiment showing that opinions can diverge when one-dimensional opinions are formed from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010599058
We study the effect of disclosure on information acquisition and transmission in a dynamic reputation model. In each period, to make a report to a client, an expert chooses between conducting a costly investigation or channeling a message from an interest group. We show that not disclosing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617075
This paper studies optimal decision rules for a decision maker who can consult two experts in an environment without monetary payments. This extends the previous work by Holmström (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) who consider environments with one expert. In order to derive optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008739211
We provide a sufficient condition under which an uninformed principal can infer any information that is common knowledge among two experts, regardless of the structure of the parties’ beliefs. The condition requires that the bias of each expert is less than the radius of the smallest ball...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662394