In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibriumbidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

and rule-based auction procurement procedures. We show that adopting a two stage approach in which bureaucrats first … corruption risks often observed in negotiated procedures. For rule-based procedures, we show that a "third-price lottery" in …

and rule-based auction procurement procedures. We show that adopting a two stage approach in which bureaucrats first … corruption risks often observed in negotiated procedures. For rule-based procedures, we show that a "third-price lottery" in …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

We study the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a first-price public procurement … government, who may request a bribe from the winning firm afterward. We first show that, in the absence of corruption, the … bureaucrat will invite more than socially optimal number of firms into the auction. Secondly, the effects of corruption on …

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …

We study how poor quality of institution, such as corruption in public procurement auction, could hurt welfare. We show … how competition effect could improve the cost-efficiency but not the quality of a public procurement auction with … corruption. In fact, no incentive mechanism can be efficient in this auction if qualities are non-contractible. An empirical …