commitment of donors must not be in doubt. For these conditions to be in place, conflict resolution must be in donors' interests …

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …

agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. We model the default option of outright conflict as a … probabilistic contest. Examples of such contests may be international conflict, litigation, and elections. We show, in particular …, that if the loss of surplus from outright conflict is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability …

potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any mechanism must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …

potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids … a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We … show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information …

influencing the policy choice by changing the political institutions in the target country (with or without a civil war). We … dynamics and for internal conflict than is commonly acknowledged in both empirical and theoretical research. …

influencing the policy choice by changing the political institutions in the target country (with or without a civil war). We … dynamics and for internal conflict than is commonly acknowledged in both empirical and theoretical research. …