It is shown that steady state Markov perfect equilibria of discrete time, infinite horizon, quadratic, adjustment cost games differ from equilibria of their infinitely repeated counterpart games with zero adjustment costs even though no adjustment costs are paid in the steady state. In contrast...

It is shown that steady state Markov perfect equilibria of discrete time, infinite horizon, quadratic, adjustment cost games differ from equilibria of their infinitely repeated counterpart games with zero adjustment costs even though no adjustment costs are paid in the steady state. In contrast...

A puzzle in the analysis of trade policy is why free trade outcomes, which maximize world income, are not more often observed. One reason is that economics agents with special interests affect both the form and level of international protective policies. This paper investigates the dynamic...

The effects of entry and exit by monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers on equilibrium business cycles are analyzed in the presence of internal returns to scale and external returns to specialization. In the environment studied, market power and endogenous entry and exit, in...

The effects of an unilateral tariff on prices, quantities, and welfare in the presence of a dynamic elements facing imperfectly competitive firms is examined. International duopolists, selling differentiated products, interact strategically in price setting game under the tariff policy. It is...

This paper examines the transitional dynamics of economic integration in the two country endogenous growth model of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and in an extension by Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1992). It is shown that, in the absence of knowledge flows across countries economic integration will...