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Goltsman, Maria (contributor); Pavlov, Gregory (contributor) - 2008

We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that whenever the sender can communicate informatively with both receivers by sending private messages, she can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003772300

Political polarization

Dixit, Avinash K. (contributor); … - 2007 - This revision: April 19, 2007

Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy while others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003426464

Communication and decision-making in corporate boards

Malenko, Nadya - 2011

Time constraints, managerial power, and reputational concerns can impede board communication. This paper develops a model where board decisions depend on directors' effort in communicating their information to others. I show that directors communicate more effectively when pressure for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506636

Activists versus captured regulators

Daubanes, Julien; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 2013

We analyze the consequences of activism in a regulated industry where the regulator has been captured by the industry. Unlike ordinary economic agents, activists are insensitive to monetary incentives. Moreover, they are less well informed than regulators and their actions generate dead-weight...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199716

Turf wars

Herrera, Helios; Reuben, Ernesto; Ting, Michael M. - 2014

Turf wars commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010422047

The rise of NGO activism

Daubanes, Julien; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 2016 - This version: April, 2016

Activist NGOs increasingly oppose industrial projects that have nevertheless been approved by public regulators. To understand this recent rise in NGO activism, we develop a theory of optimal regulation in which a regulated industry seeks to undertake a project that may be harmful to society. On...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011474646

Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of the international conflict

Tangerås, Thomas P. (contributor) - 2008

This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate … can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being … and international conflict. -- Democracy ; autocracy ; war ; Maximal Equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003723925

Default risk sharing between banks and markets : the contribution of collateralized debt obligations

Franke, Günter (contributor); … - 2005

This paper contributes to the economics of financial institutions risk management by exploring how loan securitization affects their default risk, their systematic risk, and their stock prices. In a typical CDO transaction a bank retains through a first loss piece a very high proportion of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003221977

Strategic Information Revelation When Experts Compete to Influence

Bhattacharya, Sourav - 2011

We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially conflicting self-interests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, or, a judge. The judge prefers to take an action that is most appropriate given the true state of the world but the experts' preferences over the actions (i.e.,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128237

Managing Disputes Through Contract : Evidence from M&A

Coates, IV, John C. - 2012

An important set of contract terms manages potential disputes. In a detailed, hand-coded sample of mergers and acquisition (M&A) contracts from 2007 and 2008, dispute management provisions in correlate strongly with target ownership, state of incorporation, and industry, and with the experience...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113193