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'Altruistic' and 'Antisocial' Punishers are One and the Same

Eriksson, Kimmo; Cownden, Daniel; Ehn, Micael; … - In: Review of Behavioral Economics 1 (2014) 3, pp. 209-221

In certain economic experiments, some participants willingly pay a cost to punish peers who contribute too little to the public good. Because such punishment can lead to improved group outcomes, this costly punishment has been conceived of as altruistic. Here, we provide evidence that individual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777165

4. Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems

Martin, Lisa L. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994) 4, pp. 473-493

enhance the probability of cooperation, if states are able to link issues credibly. International decision-making rules that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777786

Is Full Compliance Possible?

Bednar, Jenna - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 18 (2006) 3, pp. 347-375

Games of public good provision, collective action, and collusion share concern for the free rider that shirks on its obligations. According to the folk theorem, the free rider problem can be resolved through punishment mechanisms. Versions of the folk theorem have been applied when monitoring is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777797

3. The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions

Snidal, Duncan - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994) 4, pp. 449-472

The international relations (IR) and common-pool resource (CPR) literatures disagree on the impact of increasing numbers of actors on collective action. They also disagree on the impact of actor heterogeneity. These differences can be understood in terms of the endogeneity of institutions,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777823

Legislative Cooperation among Impatient Legislators

Fox, Justin - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 18 (2006) 1, pp. 68-97

Sufficient conditions for legislative cooperation are identified within the context of a model of repeated legislative … interaction. We show that in many environments, cooperation is sustainable even among impatient legislators. Special attention is … large, parameterizations of the model which do not admit cooperation are rare and atypical. Furthermore, contrary to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010777914

Cooperation in Small Groups: The Effect of Group Size

Nosenzo, Daniele; Quercia, Simone; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2012

Previous experiments have found a moderate, positive effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution … results from n-person prisoner’s dilemma and oligopoly experiments where group size has a negative effect on cooperation. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781894

Cooperation and Punishment under Uncertain Enforcement

Sousa, Sergio - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2010

cooperation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781895

Giving is a question of time: Response times and contributions to a real world public good

Lohse, Johannes; Goeschl, Timo; Diederich, Johannes - Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, … - 2014

Recent experimental research has examined whether contributions to public goods can be traced back to intuitive or deliberative decision-making, using response times in public good games in order to identify the specific decision process at work. In light of conflicting results, this paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010782021

Norm enforcement in the city: A natural field experiment

Balafoutas, Loukas; Nikiforakis, Nikos - In: European Economic Review 56 (2012) 8, pp. 1773-1785

Extensive evidence from laboratory experiments indicates that many individuals are willing to use costly punishment to enforce social norms, even in one-shot interactions. However, there appears to be little evidence in the literature of such behavior in the field. We study the propensity to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588201

Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game in flocks

Chen, Zhuo; Gao, Jianxi; Cai, Yunze; Xu, Xiaoming - In: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 390 (2011) 1, pp. 50-56

agents move, we find that cooperation can not only be maintained in such a system but there exists an optimal size of … interaction neighborhood, which can induce the maximum cooperation level. When compared with the case that all agents do not move …, cooperation can even be enhanced by the mobility of individuals, provided that the velocity and the size of neighborhood are not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010588561