, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes … are cast and one of the options is implemented. We introduce the possibility of leadership whereby a certain voter, the …

, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes … are cast and one of the options is implemented. We introduce the possibility of leadership whereby a certain voter, the …

This paper analyses leadership and charisma within the framework of social choice. In societies that lack formal …

Who will vote quadratically in large-N elections under quadratic voting (QV)? First, who will vote? Although the core …, voting behavior and outcomes would be determined predominately by social and psychological forces, would thereby exhibit few … that require a different research agenda to bring into focus. Some of our analysis also has implications for voting …

expert decide” in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a …

political phenomena that ensued is presented. In the case of sophisticated voting over certain kinds of binary agendas, such as … sometimes yield “sophisticated sincerity”, where equilibrium voting behavior is indistinguishable from sincere voting. Under … behave leads to probabilistic voting models that typically yield utilitarian outcomes. Uncertainty among the voters over …

for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level …

for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level …

for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level …