In this paper I present a simple model through which I examine how large unwanted outcomes in a process subject to one’s decisions can be avoided. The paper has implications for decision makers in the field of economics, financial markets and also everyday life. Probably the most interesting...

In this paper I present a method for the simulation of the default of such loans that have two important properties: they are seasoned – maybe even being at different points of the seasoning curve – and they evolve in an asset-value based framework. This latter model allows us to introduce...

In this paper I question whether the risk weights in the advanced (IRB) approach of the Basel 2 regulation are appropriate, on a strictly theoretical ground. The major concern is that the model behind the regulation considers defaults only at the end of the time horizon for which capital is to...

In this chapter I argue that as a response to the introduction of capital requirements in the form of risk weights investors might potentially choose riskier portfolios than before the regulation – this is, presumably, not what the regulation intends to achieve. That is, while regulation most...

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...

We present an international trade model with multiproduct firms. Firms are heterogeneously endowed with two types of capabilities that jointly determine the trade-off within firms between managing a large portfolio of products and producing at low marginal cost. The model can explain many of the...

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts...

We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we...