The paper generalizes the Kiyotaki-Wright trade model by treating the trading period as a finite game, so Nash's theorem can be used to prove the existence of equilibrium, and by treating the economy as a Markov process, so an ergodic theorem can be used to show the existence of equilibria with...

Many of the applications of game theory have been to economics where the individuals under study are assumed to be maximizing profits or Òutility'' or some other conventional economic goal of Òstatus.'' Loosely stated we think of status as one's position in a society compared with others,...

There is increasing evidence that collective behavior, such as social choice, price dynamics, and strategic behavior, is related to nonlinear dynamics and thus has the potential for instability and complex behavior. This paper presents experimental results where subjects are placed in a...

Within the resource-based view of the firm, a dynamic story has emerged in which the knowledge accumulated over the history of a firm and embedded in organizational routines and structures influences the firmÕs ability to recognize the value of new resources and capabilities. This paper...

The spatial model of voting is a benchmark in theories purporting to explain political behavior. Yet, evidence against the accuracy of both the assumptions and predictions of the spatial model is accumulating in the scholarly literature. One long-held result of spatial theory is that incumbents...

The Dvorak keyboard has been claimed to be greatly superior to the standard typwriter keyboard. However, none of the earlier research on the relative merits of the two keyboards provided unconfounded measures, ones permitting attributrion of the results solely to the differences between the...

The study of learning in games encompasses two research lines: (1) explaining the aggregate stability of classes of games when players use inductive reasoning, and (2) explaining the learning rules used by actual players. We mix approaches by considering both stability and learning rules in...

A three-class game of redistribution without a pure strategy equilibrium is studied under a model of adaptive politicians. This model allows us to integrate one person - one vote models of redistribution with the models which emphasize political influence so as to study when different social...

In the present paper I introduce the revelation principle of bounded rationality. The principle states that any behavior that a model of bounded rationality exhibits can be implemented as the choice of an agent with preferences and beliefs consistent with Savage-Bayesian rationality. The...

Technological change at the firm level has commonly been modeled as random sampling from a fixed distribution o f possibilities. Such models, however, typically ignore empirically important aspects of the firm's search process, notably the observation that the present state of the firm guides...