In order to explain excess co-operation in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma game, we first question the standard assumption of stable and selfish preferences by introducing the concept of social capital. This analysis leads to a model that explains excess co-operation through an accumulation of...

This paper analyses preference evolution in a bargaining situation. We show <p> that preferences for reciprocity, that sustain a conflict-free outcome, are viable <p> if players have enough information about opponents’ preferences. However, depending <p> on the initial starting point, preference...</p></p></p>

Official development assistance (grants and subsidized loans from foreign aid agencies) is the main source of external finance in developing countries. These financial aid flows are positively correlated with the recipients' business cycles, which is puzzling because it reinforces already strong...

This paper argues that the static vision in ecological economics of a fundamental clash between a neo-classical self-interest perspective and limit discourse as de-ontological perspective is an ineffective route towards disseminating environmental values and consciousness. Following the...