Often, fi xed-line incumbents also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile...

We investigate cooperative investment in a new infrastructure and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment only increases total coverage if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high....

Investments in Next Generation Access Networks (NGANs) ask for a new set of regulatory remedies. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on three issues: the migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA infrastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might affect this...

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of contacts. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is...

In this paper, we analyse the specific national broadband plans which have been developed by some European governments to foster the deployment of next generation access networks, namely in France, Italy, and Portugal. In particular, we discuss the strategies adopted to achieve wide fibre...

In this paper, we study the impact of co-investment by incumbents and entrants on the roll-out of network infrastructures under demand uncertainty. We show that if entrants can wait to co-invest until demand is realized, the incumbents' investment incentives are reduced and total coverage can be...

We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure iinvestments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges firms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay first investment....

We analyze how sharing rules affect Nash equilibria in Bertrand games, where the sharing of profits at ties is a decisive assumption. Necessary conditions for either positive or zero equilibrium profits are derived. Zero profit equilibria are shown to exist under weak conditions if the sharing...

We analyse the effects of universal service obligations, such as uniform pricing, price caps and unbundling, on allocations in markets newly opened to competition, e.g. telecommunications. If uniform pricing is imposed not only on incumbents but also on entrants, entry may not result in...

We prove the existence of symmetric pure Cournot equilibria with heterogeneous goods under the following condition: each firm reacts to a rise in competirors output in such a way that its market price does not rise. This condition is not related to wether goods are strategic substitutes or...