We integrate strategic-trade and political-economy considerations in a unified framework to analyse unilateral trade policy. Foreign firms compete on Home's market through export or foreign direct investment (FDI). They also lobby Home's government which sets trade (tariff) and industrial (tax)...

In this paper, we examine strategic R&D policy for quality-differentiated products in a thirdmarket trade model. We extend the previous work by adding a third exporting country, so that the market structure is international triopoly. We show that the presence of the third exporting country...

We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we let the governments in the importing and exporting countries use tax instruments strategically to shift rents up or down the vertical value-chain....

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms, where countries can invest into basic research to improve their technological potential. These research investments tighten firm selection and raise the average productivity of firms in the market, thereby...

This paper studies steady-state, Markov-Perfect strategic trade policy when (infinitely lived) governments are committed to trade policy during two periods. We compare the case in which both governments choose their export subsidies in the same periods (synchronization) versus the case in which...

We study the effect of market structure upon international trade policy when firms invest in process R&D before competing in a differentiated goods market. For a domestic monopoly, and increasing the number of foreign firms, the government either chooses a R&D (and output) subsidy, or remains...

We study a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous fi rms, where countries can strategically invest in technology. The countries’ motive is to improve fi rms’ productivity, leading to a competitive advantage in international trade. We are interested in how trade...

We examine the strategic use of recycled content standards (RCSs) under international duopoly. RCSs require firms supplying the domestic market to use a certain proportion of recycled materials as inputs. We demonstrate that, when there is no trade in recycled materials, two identical countries...

This paper examines strategic motives to impose mandatory labelling of biotechnology products when consumers perceive these products as being of lower quality. When a foreign dominant firm produces a biotechnology product, it is shown that without mandatory labelling fringe firms, which produce...