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used vertical restraints to support collusion. We find that one quarter of a sample of convicted contemporary international … otherwise have undermined collusion. In other cases, distributors themselves had market power and received a share of cartel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033863
This article examines optimal policy toward coordinated oligopolistic price elevation. First, it analyzes the social welfare implications of enforcement, elaborating the value of deterrence and the nature of possible chilling effects. Then, it explores a variety of means of detection, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037859
This chapter sets out the principles and emerging practice governing cartel damages in the EU and UK. It identifies the types of damages available; the issue surrounding causation, pass-on, volume effects, and mitigation; and the methods that have been be used to estimate overcharges, volume...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212073
especially vulnerable to distortion through not only corruption but also stable supplier collusion (collusive tendering or bid … supplier collusion, even by a small percentage, can yield significant savings to the public purse and ensure better quality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849477
In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144908
first investigate the extent to which collusive agreements are feasible. Secondly, we focus on collusion sustainability in … an infinitely repeated game. We show that, regardless of the degree of cost asymmetry, at least some collusion is always … sustainable. Finally, the degree of collusion is also endogeneised to show that cooperation has an upper bound determined by the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243009
lowering the prices they offer to customers. These mechanisms create much greater scope for collusion than economic models … unconcentrated the industry becomes. In some instances, lower market concentration makes collusion easier; smaller firms may be more … dependent on collaboration with rivals and thus may be easier to punish if they undercut collusion. These results run directly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013245478
Competitors privately sharing price intentions is universally prohibited under antitrust/competition law. In contrast, there is no common well-accepted treatment of competitors privately sharing prices. This paper shows that firms sharing prices leads to higher prices. Based on this theory of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012831930
Leniency programs lower the expected cost of anticompetitive behavior to the extent that they allow colluding firms to pay reduced fines. This paper connects this potential adverse effect to the number of firms involved in the cartel agreement. It is shown that leniency programs may provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012714612
An important action that is illegal according to competition law, both in the US and Europe, is predatory pricing. In this paper we develop a model that allows an entrant to sue an incumbent for predatory pricing. The cost of production is essential for judgments in such cases, and we allow the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012719265