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must periodically reduce prices in order to sustain collusion when goods are storable and the market is large. The largest …. Sales foster collusion, by magnifying the intertemporal links in consumers' decisions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071258
In an oligopoly configuration characterized by high barriers to (re-)entry, a finite horizon, perfect information about demand and costs and the presence of three identical firms, we show that two of them (the predators) can choose to charge an initial price that is so low that the third (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092518
We highlight conditions under which R&D agreements may harm consumers by increasing final prices. This occurs although members of the R&D agreement increase their R&D efforts. We focus on cases where firms compete both on the final market and to buy an input necessary for R&D. The market is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187372
This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric …-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the … collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650691
The paper develops a simple supergame model of collusion that focuses on the role of fixed (exogenous to game played … collusion based on market price behavior. Following conclusions of the theoretical model we propose marker of collusion based on … detecting changes in seasonal parameters of prices in periods of possible collusion. An empirical application of method has been …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008774318
In a retail gasoline market exhibiting Edgeworth Price Cycles, prices change asymmetrically with many small decreases interrupted by occasional large increases. The result is a de facto menu of prices from which consumers can choose based on exactly when they buy. This article introduces four...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010571717
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) show that strategic delegation reduces firm profits in the one-shot Cournot game. Allowing for infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation can increase firm profits as it improves cartel stability.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010579072
Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of competition authorities. A special case of cartel is the parallel behaviour in terms of price selling. This type of behaviour is difficult to assess and its analysis has not always conclusive results. For evaluating such behaviour the data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607173
input assumption it was found that collusion in the labor market and collusion in the product market have exactly the same …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010634130
A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the .nal market. In a Cournot …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852180