Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 53,617
Cover Image
DO ELECTIONS ALWAYS NOTIVATE INCUMBENTS? LEARNING VS CAREER CONCERNS
Borgne, Eric Le; Lockwood, Ben - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2004
becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more … than offset the positive “career concerns” effect of elections on effort. Moreover, when this occurs, appointment of … is initially uninformed about the officeholder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368541
Cover Image
Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents?.
le Borgne, E.; Lockwood, B. - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2000
office-holder is initially uninformed about herability (following Holmström, 1999). If office-holder effort and ability … experiment, i.e. raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005583035
Cover Image
Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns
Le Borgne, Eric - 2006
effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the experimentation effect, and … the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive career-concerns effect of elections on effort. Moreover …, where the officeholder is initially uninformed about her ability. If officeholder effort and ability interact in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783048
Cover Image
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers: Supplementary Materiel
Diermeier, Daniel; Keane, Michael; Merlo, Antonio - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
This paper contains additional details about the model in our paper “A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers” (Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2004)), as well as the computational methods we use to solve and estimate the model, and the construction of the data set.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061913
Cover Image
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Diermeier, Daniel; Keane, Michael; Merlo, Antonio - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002
Theories in political economy depend critically on assumptions about motivations of politicians. Our analysis starts from the premise that politicians, like other economic agents, are rational individuals who make career decisions by comparing the expected returns of alternative choices. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109583
Cover Image
Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy
Volokh, Alexander - 2014
A common argument against privatization is that private providers will self-interestedly lobby to increase the size of their market. In this Article, I evaluate this argument, using, as a case study, the argument against prison privatization based on the possibility that the private prison...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054697
Cover Image
Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India
Iyer, Lakshmi; Mani, Anandi - In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (2012) 3, pp. 723-739
We develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns and the consequent implications for bureaucrats' career investments. Unique microlevel data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011009973
Cover Image
Citizens or lobbies : who controls policy?
Roberti, Paolo - 2016
This paper analyses a model of electoral competition with lobbying, where candidates hold private information about their willingness to pander to lobbies, if elected. I show that this uncertainty induces risk-averse voters to choose candidates who implement policies biased in favor of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703380
Cover Image
Lobbying in a multidimensional policy space with salient issues
Roberti, Paolo - 2014
We present a citizen-candidate model on a multidimensional policy space with lobbying, where citizens regard some issues more salient than others. We find that special interest groups that lobby on less salient topics move the implemented policy closer to their preferred policy, compared to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011729170
Cover Image
Endogenous Lobbying
Felli, Leonardo; Merlo, Antonio - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2001
In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109610