This paper develops an analytical framework that can be used to anticipate problems in the banking system and enable supervisors to take mitigating actions at an early stage. This paper has two components. First, it develops an early warning indicator that is intended to capture a number of the...

This paper describes concepts and tools behind macroprudential monitoring, and the growing importance of macroprudential tools for assessing the stability of financial systems. This paper also employs a macroprudential approach in examining financial soundness and identifying its determinants....

This paper describes concepts and tools behind macroprudential monitoring and the growing importance of macroprudential tools for assessing the stability of financial systems. This paper also employs a macroprudential approach in examining financial soundness and identifying its determinants....

We examine the impact of so-called "Crisis Contracts" on bank managers' risktaking incentives and on the probability of banking crises. Under a Crisis Contract, managers are required to contribute a pre-specified share of their past earnings to finance public rescue funds when a crisis occurs....

Debt overhang and moral hazard related to risk-shifting opportunities predict that low capitalized banks have a lower likelihood to issue equity. In contrast to this view, for an international sample of bank Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs), we show that the likelihood of issuing an SEO is...

We analyze the problem of a policy authority (PA) that must decide when to resolve a troubled bank whose underlying solvency is uncertain. Delaying resolution increases the chance that information arrives that reveals the bank's true solvency state. However, delaying resolution also gives...

We assess the cleansing effects of the recent banking crisis. In U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks during the crisis, there is less restructuring in the real sector and the banking sector remains less healthy for several years after the crisis....

We integrate bank and bond financing into a two-sector neoclassical growth model to examine the stabilization effect of endogenous bank leverage adjustment. We show that although bank leverage amplifies shocks, the increase of leverage to a decline in bank equity is an automatic stabilizer in...

We evaluate the abnormal returns of issuing and non-issuing banks around the announcement of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) and explore how the market reaction is influenced by aggregate systemic conditions and by the systemic risk contribution and exposure of banks. While we find evidence of...

I propose a dynamic general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and slow recovery from crises. When banks' investment decisions are not contractible, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a...