We address a basic diffculty with incorporating fairness into standard utilitarian choice theories. Standard utilitarian theories evaluate lotteries according to the (weighted) utility over ?nal outcomes and assume in particular that a lottery is never preferred over getting the most preferred...

This paper describes a general principle that can be used to elicit honest opinions, even if risk attitudes are unknown.

Why do diverse groups outperform homogeneous groups in some settings, but not in others? We show that while diverse groups experience more frictions than homogeneous ones, they are also less conformist. Homogeneous groups minimize the risk of miscoordination, but they may get stuck in an...

A decision maker, named Alice, wants to know if an expert has significant information about payoff-relevant probabilities of future events. The expert, named Bob, either knows this probability almost perfectly or knows nothing about it. Hence, both Alice and the uninformed expert face...

This paper models an agent in a multi-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided to capture updating biases that reflect excessive weight...

In 1908 the Welsh neurologist and psychoanlayst Ernest Jones described human beings as rationalizers whose behavior is governed by "the necessity of providing an explanation." We construct a formal and testable model of rationalization in which a decision maker selects her preferred alternative...

Theories can be produced by individuals seeking a good reputation of knowledge. Hence, a significant question is how to test theories anticipating that they might have been produced by (potentially uninformed) experts who prefer their theories not to be rejected. If a theory that predicts...

A stage game is played infinitely many times. After observing the outcomes of the games, players revise their beliefs about opponents' strategies. I show the general conditions under which players' predictions become accurate fast. Key words: Repeated Games, Rational Learning, Speed of...

In this paper I consider a dynamically complete market model without intrinsic uncertainty. The only uncertainty is modelled by sunspots. Agents' beliefs are heterogeneous, but eventually become homogeneous in the sense that agents' beliefs are identical in the limit. I show that if some states...

Two long lived players play a repeated coordination game. Players do not specify a single (and correct) probability to each event. They have a vague notion about the evolution of the play, called blurry beliefs, which guide their behavior. General conditions that ensure cooperation are...