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Cramton, Peter; Gibbons, Robert; Klemperer, Paul - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 1987

dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988765

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

Cripps, Martin W.; Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2002

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126688

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

Cripps, Martin W.; Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126728

A backward induction experiment

Binmore, K.; McCarthy, J.; Ponti, G. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136818

Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations

Cripps, M.W.; Mailath, G.J.; Samuelson, L. - Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136831

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

Tejada, Oriol - Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona - 2009

I prove that, in assignment markets with more than two sides, agents of different sides (or sectors) need not be complements, whereas agents of the same side need not be substitutes. Shapley (1962) showed that this cannot happen when assignment markets are bilateral. Nevertheless, I found...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998476

Coalitional negotiation

MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), … - 1999

We develop a two-stage negotiation model to study the impact of costly inspections on both the coalition formation outcome and the per-member payoffs. In the first stage, the players are forming coalitions and inside each coalition formed the members share the coalition benefits. We adopt the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008327

Reputation Effects

Mailath, George J. - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2007

This article gives a brief introduction to reputation effects. A canonical model is described, the reputation bound result of Fudenberg and Levine (1989 1992) and the temporary reputation result of Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, 2007) are stated and discussed.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061925

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

Cripps, Martin W.; Samuelson, Larry - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061932

The Effect of Outside Options on Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

Wickelgren, Abraham L. - Econometric Society - 2004

's valuation is private information. They show that, for some parameter values, trade occurs at the Rubinstein (1982) prices given … equilibrium for this bargaining game with asymmetric information and outside options. It turns out that giving the seller an … asymmetric information. Without outside options, the asymmetric information solution approaches the complete information solution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063605