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Feedback and incentives: experimental evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2008

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … off. Moreover, in both pay schemes information feedback reduces the quality of the low performers' work. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268675

College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

Pais, Joana; Pintér, Agnes; Veszteg, Róbert F. - 2008

experimental lab in three different informational settings, and study the role of information in individual decision making. Our … truthful preference revelation. In addition, we find that information has an important effect on truthful behavior and … stability. Nevertheless, regarding efficiency, the Gale-Shapley mechanism is less sensitive to the amount of information …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332350

Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution

Cho, In-Koo; Matsui, Akihiko - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 4, pp. 1659-1688

We investigate a canonical search-theoretic model without entry. Two agents are randomly matched with a long side being rationed. The matched agents face a pair of randomly drawn non-transferable payoffs, and then choose whether or not to form a partnership subject to a small probability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678871

Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics

Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

This volume collects almost two decades of joint work of Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell on game dynamics and equilibria. The starting point was the introduction of the adaptive strategy called <i>regret-matching</i>, which on the one hand is simple and natural, and on the other is shown to lead to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011156379

A Theory of Enterprise

McCain, Roger A. - In: Value Solutions in Cooperative Games

AbstractThe following sections are included:An Overview of the ModelFCS GamesConsiderable Solutions in FCS GamesThe CoreDetermination of the Feasible Condition StructuresA Coalition for Production and SaleA Production-and-Sale Coalition in a Steady StateOptimality within the CoalitionBargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206347

ADAPTIVE HEURISTICS

Hart, Sergiu - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …

AbstractWe exhibit a large class of simple rules of behavior, which we call adaptive heuristics, and show that they generate rational behavior in the long run. These adaptive heuristics are based on natural regret measures, and may be viewed as a bridge between rational and behavioral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206382

GENERAL PROCEDURES LEADING TO CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA

Cahn, Amotz - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …

AbstractHart and Mas-Colell (2000) show that if all players play “regret matching” strategies, i.e., they play with probabilities proportional to the regrets, then the empirical distribution of play converges to the set of correlated equilibria, and the regrets of every player converge to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206392

Nontransferable Utility Games and Games in Partition Function Form

McCain, Roger A. - In: Value Solutions in Cooperative Games

AbstractThe following sections are included:PreliminariaTU Games in Partition Function FormSymmetrySuperadditivityEfficiencySuccessor FunctionNTU Games in Partition Function FormSuperior GamesExample: A Common-Property ResourceExample: A Cartel with Differentiated ProductsChapter Summary

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206456

HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? THE COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY OF UNCOUPLED EQUILIBRIUM PROCEDURES

Hart, Sergiu; Mansour, Yishay - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …

AbstractWe study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the communication complexity of reaching a Nash equilibrium, i.e., on the number of bits that need...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206487

Zeuthen–Nash Bargaining

McCain, Roger A. - In: Value Solutions in Cooperative Games

AbstractThe following sections are included:Nontransferable Utility GamesZeuthen's SolutionNash Bargaining with Equal Bargaining PowerVariable-Threat BargainingNash Bargaining and Nash EquilibriumUnequal Bargaining PowerChapter Summary

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206505