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I examine a game-theoretic model of heterosexual courtship. Male-female pairs are randomly matched and decide whether to make romantic advances towards each other. They receive payoffs that depend on the utility from a romantic match, and the costs of rejection and unwanted advances/harassment....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902661
The ultimatum game is a sequential-move bargaining game in which a “giver” offers a “taker” a share of a monetary pie. The predicted subgame perfect equilibrium is for rational givers to offer the smallest possible share, and for rational takers to accept. Experimental trials conducted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905908
We analyze a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of an extensive game with perfect information induced by the firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898433
We study how barter exchanges should be conducted through a centralized mechanism in a dynamically evolving agent pool with time- and compatibility-based preferences. We find the dynamically optimal two-way and multi-way exchange mechanisms that maximize total discounted exchange surplus....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012767124
We experimentally study how redistribution choices are affected by positive and negative information regarding the … information. We find that both conformity and counter-conformity are driven by a desire to be seen as moral (the ‘symbolization … centrality of moral identity to the self (the ‘internalization' dimension of moral identity). Social information thus seems to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865728
settlement"), which also gives the activist access to better information. I find that the information that will be conveyed by … settlement, the incumbent's rejection of board settlement reflects more of its private information, increasing the activist … increases (decreases) with information asymmetry, and the average ex-post shareholder value upon reaching board settlement is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853311
In bargaining theory a usual assumption is either that of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions or that of continuous preferences. Recently we considered in Glycopantis a bargaining model which breaks away from this traditional treatment by employing lexicographic preferences of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861824
French Abstract: Nous introduisons un modèle stratégique de négociations à deux joueurs avec des preferences dans le risque de type utilité non-espérée. Nous définissons la notion de prime de risque de désaccord, un analogue séquentiel du concept d'audace, afin de prendre en compte le...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048508
We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems under the assumption of coalitional sovereignty, meaning that a deviating coalition of players does not have the power to arrange the matches of agents outside the coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989559
Prosociality is fundamental to human social life, and, accordingly, much research has attempted to explain human prosocial behavior. Capraro and Rand (Judgment and Decision Making, 13, 99-111, 2018) recently provided experimental evidence that prosociality in anonymous, one-shot interactions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012919791