Stricter laws require more incisive and costlier enforcement. Since enforcement activity depends both on available tax … and decreasing in officials' corruption. In contrast to the "tollbooth view" of regulation, the standard chosen by a self …-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials' corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a …

We model an enforcement problem where firms can take a known and lawful action or seek a profitable innovation that may … greater is potential corruption, the more rigid the optimal norms. …

fines and damages for liability; or the choice of legal standards in antitrust law enforcement. The business practices are …

authorization and strict authorization. We find that corruption plays a critical role in the choice of the authorization regime …. Corruption exacerbates the costs of using lenient authorization, under which production of socially harmful goods is always … authorized. In contrast, corruption can be socially beneficial under strict authorization, since it can mitigate an over …

authorization and strict authorization. We find that corruption plays a critical role in the choice of the authorization regime …. Corruption exacerbates the costs of using lenient authorization, under which production of socially harmful goods is always … authorized. In contrast, corruption can be socially beneficial under strict authorization, since it can mitigate an over …

only mild punishment (constrained enforcement regime). …

We use high-quality panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant U.S. attorneys and relative public … greater prosecutor resources result in more convictions for corruption, other things equal. We find more limited, recent … previously identified correlates and causes of corruption. By explicitly determining the allocation of prosecutorial resources …