The Condorcet Efficiency of a voting rule is defined as the conditional probability that the voting rule elects the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (PMRW), given that a PMRW exists. Five simple voting rules are considered in this paper: Plurality Rule, Negative Plurality Rule, Borda Rule,...

This essay examines the sensitivity of collective rankings and winners to the weights used in score vectors that are applied to sets of individual rankings to yield collectieve rankings in a typical additive manner. The paper considers probabilities of getting the same winner and the same...

This paper has examined the relationship between social homogeneity measured by σ(p)=p <Subscript>1</Subscript> <Superscript>2</Superscript> + ... + p <Subscript>6</Subscript> <Superscript>2</Superscript> and the likelihood of Condorcet's paradox. Attention was restricted to three-candidate elections. It was shown first that the most general restriction on p vectors that produces a definite...</superscript></subscript></superscript></subscript>

The Borda Compromise states that, if one has to choose among five popular voting rules that are not Condorcet consistent, one should always give preference to the Borda rule over the four other rules. We assess the theoretical as well as the empirical support for the Borda Compromise. We find...

Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n→∞, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over...

Consider an election on three candidates for n voters with complete and transitive preference rankings on the candidates. Let k (r) denote the minimum total number of last (middle) position rankings for each of the three candidates. If k is close to zero, some candidate is seldom disliked and is...