Bargaining and dilemma games have developed in experimental economics as fairly separate literatures. More than a few analysts are now persuaded that the patterns of behavior in these games are closely related, and considerable effort is being put into a search for models that bridge the gap...

Economists traditionally tackle normative problems by computing optimal policy, i.e. the one that maximizes a social welfare function. In practice, however, a succession of marginal changes to a limited number of policy instruments are implemented, until no further improvement is feasible. I...

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of...

This paper introduces the payoff-confirming analogy-based expectation equilibrium (PCABEE) as a way to refine the set of analogy-based equilibria and the associated admissible analogy partitions. In addition to the actions of others, own payoff history provides information about others’...

In this methodological work I explore the possibility of explicitly modelling expec-tations conditioning the R&D decisions of firms. In order to isolate this problem from the controversies of cognitive science, I propose a black box strategy through the concept of internal model . The last part...

This contribution focuses on the simulation of the emergence and evolution of communities of practice, a concept brought forwards originally in sociology in the early 90’s by Lave and Wenger (1990) and Brown and Duguid (1991). In a first part, the main theoretical principles on which relies...