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This paper examines the three cases of hostile takeovers in Germany in the post Second World War period. It describes the important role played by banks in affecting the outcome of the bids: bank representatives were chairmen of the supervisory board in all three cases and banks voted a large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011424440
This paper examines the relation between capital markets and corporate control in France, Germany and the UK. It compares levels of takeover activity in the three countries and describes the degree to which takeovers are associated with changes in corporate control. The paper examines the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011424444
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011424445
The authors argue against the need for capital adequacy requirements in the regulation of investment management because the main cause of failure is fraud or irregular dealing. The European Commission, in its investment services directive, has various aims but its detailed suggestions will not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011424447
In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011424451
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011424452
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011424458
Economic theory points to five parties disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in takeovers, nonexecutive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This paper reports the first comparative evaluation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011424462
We show that in countries with strong investor protection, developed financial markets, and active markets for corporate control, family firms evolve into widely held companies as they age. In countries with weak investor protection, less developed financial markets, and inactive markets for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011425198
Twentieth century Japan provides a remarkable laboratory for examining how an externally imposed institutional and regulatory intervention affects the ownership of corporations. In the first half of the century, Japan had weak legal protection but strong institutional arrangements. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011426579