This paper examines the foundations of the prediction that the costs of, and returns to, an investment in specific human capital will be shared between worker and firm, and hence that in the presence of specific human capital there will be a positive relationship between wage and tenure. It is...

Two sources of inefficiency in the provision of on-the-job training are examined: an externality between firms which arises if there is imperfect competition between firms in the labor market, and allocation inefficiency due to asymmetry of information about the value of the trained worker. The...

This paper explores the incentives faced by employers for supplying general training of the type given to craft apprentices. An investment model is developed in which the employer's return takes the form of reduced recruitment costs for skilled labor. An empirical model is derived and fitted to...

Failure in the training market may result from credit constraints and other capital market imperfections, deterring potential trainees, or labour market imperfections creating external benefits for firms. This paper presents a model of a training market affected by both problems, and examines...

A common assumption in equilibrium search and matching models of the labour market is that each firm posts a wage, to be paid to any worker hired. This paper considers the implications of firms posting "contracts", in a random matching model with on-the-job search. More complex contracts enable...

Empirical studies of the aggregate labor market matching function have favored a Cobb-Douglas functional form, for which there are no microfoundations in the existing literature. I present a new model for the matching process, based on a "telephone-line" Poisson queuing process, which, unlike...

We construct an equilibrium random matching model of the labour market, with endogenous market participation and a general matching technology that allows for market size effects: the job-finding rate for workers and the incentives for participation change with the level of unemployment. In...

Public services can be, and are, delivered according to a variety of different arrangements. The public sector can finance and provide a service itself, or contract with the private sector to participate in provision, or its role may be limited to regulating a private provider. In this paper we...

This article investigates the hypothesis that when measures of specific human capital (such as job tenure) are included in earnings functions, there may be a sample selection bias because of job-matching effectsbecause workers with high unobserved match quality receive and accept high wage...

We construct an equilibrium random matching model of the labour market, withendogenous market participation and a general matching technology that allows formarket size effects: the job-finding rate for workers and the incentives for participationchange with the level of unemployment. In...