This paper examines sets of Nash equilibrium in sender-receiver games that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. Such stable sets exist. In partial common interest games they contain only informative equilibria.

Stimulus-response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) models are estimated with experimental data from sender-receiver games and compared using the Davidson and MacKinnon P-test for non-nested hypotheses. Depending on a certain adjustment parameter, the P-test favors the SR model, the BBL model...

This paper explores how efficiency structures language. It starts from the premise that one of language's central characteristics is to provide a means for saying novel things about novel circumstances, its creativity. As such it is a metaphor for the choice of organizational forms that can cope...

This paper studies the evolution of effective pre-play communication in game where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game.

This paper proposes as a solution concept for games sets of Nash equilibria that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. We prove existence, examine some variants that are related to evolutionary solution concepts, and, most importantly, offer a unified approach to...