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Ethnic Diversity, Democracy, and Corruption
Yehoue, Etienne B. - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2007
I study the link between ethnic diversity, democracy, and corruption. In a static model, I show that contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption might emerge as a negative externality of democracy. This occurs through ethnicity, which appears as a rent-extracting technology in a democratic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248127
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Corruption, Competition, and Contracts; A Model of Vote Buying
Vardy, Felix J. J.; Morgan, John - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2006
In the presence of competing interest groups, this paper examines how the form of votebuying contracts affects policy outcomes. We study contracts contingent upon individual votes, policy outcomes, and/or vote shares. Voters either care about their individual votes, or about the policy outcome....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005248248
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Adverse Selection and Moral hazard in a Repeated Elections Models
Sundadam, R.K.; Banks, J. - University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research … - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200817
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MACROECONOMIC POLICY CYCLES UNDER ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL STRUCTURES.
TERRONES, M.E. - University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212394
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Money-Based Versus Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization; Is there Space for Political Opportunism?
Aisen, Ari - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2004
a consumption bust followed by a recovery, policymakers may consider the timing of elections when determining the … nominal anchor for stabilization. This paper finds strong evidence that the choice of nominal anchor depends on elections …, implying the existence of political opportunism. ERBS are, on average, launched before elections while MBS are set after them. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005263919
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Electoral System and Public Spending
Perotti, Roberto; Rostagno, Massimo V.; … - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2001
We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We present a model emphasizing the distinction between purchases of goods and services, which are easier to target geographically, and transfers, which are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005264182
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Coercive Redistribution and Franchise : A Preliminary Investigation Using Computable General Equilibrium Modelling.
Winer, S.L.; Rutherford, T. - School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton … - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774067
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GOVERNMENT DOMESTIC DEBT AND THE RISK OF DEFAULT: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF DEBT.
Aghion, P.; Bolton, P. - Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER), … - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777243
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Hold Your Nose and Vote; Why Do Some Democracies tolerate Corruption?
Pani, Marco - International Monetary Fund (IMF) - 2009
This paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999974
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A MODEL OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES.
ALESINA, A.; LONDREGAN, J.A.; ROSENTHAL, H. - Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102299