We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they...

To address the impact of regulation on ethical concerns of consumers, we study the example of minimum wages. In our experimental market, consumers have monopsony power, firms set prices and wages, and workers are passive recipients of a wage payment. We find that the majority of consumers...

This paper considers a population of agents that are engaged in a listening network. The agents wish to match their actions to the true value of some uncertain (exogenous) parameter and to the actions of the other agents. Each agent begins with some initial information about the parameter and,...

We apply the dynamic stochastic framework proposed by recent evolutionaryliterature to the class of strict supermodular games when two simplebehavior rules coexist in the population, imitation and myopic optimization.We assume that myopic optimizers are able to see how well their payoff...

We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they...

Given that there are significant endogenous effects in trust that cause people to follow trust norms when deciding whether to trust others, trust can be modeled as a supermodular game or a game with strategic complementarities. As such, even though the strategy choices are binary and discrete,...

Given that there are significant endogenous effects in trust that cause people to follow trust norms when deciding whether to trust others, trust can be modeled as a super modular game or a game with strategic complementarities in which individuals can converge on either mutual trust or mutual...

The central question this paper explores is “Do people keep their promise to avoid expectation-based guilt?” Using a novel design wherein we endogenously vary the promisor's expectation of what the promisee expects from him, we find that promisors are heterogeneous in their reasons for...

Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade...

Experimental evidence shows that the rational expectations hypothesis fails to characterize the path to equilibrium after an exogenous shock when actions are strategic complements. Under identical shocks, however, repetition allows adaptive learning, so that inertia in adjustment should fade...