This article investigates the policy active importers' incentives and welfare implications of using production and trade policies in a dynamic framework where production decisions occur before consumption decisions. We show that the equilibrium for production taxes and quotas are not equivalent,...

The authors extend Professor Bhagwati's analysis about the nonequivalence between trade policy instruments when domestic production is monopolized and the terms of trade are endogenous, by allowing for smuggling. They show that the dominance of the ad valorem tariff over the quota is not robust....

We consider a model in which an innovating monopolist of a technologically superior intermediate input must sell this product to final output producers. Prior research shows that, with complete information, the monopolist's optimal strategy will lead to complete adoption of this technologically...

In the absence of a binding pre-commitment mechanism, a government has an incentive to renege on announced policy. This is a well-established result in the literature. The paper applies this theory to tariff policy by developing a two-game model to analyze the credibility of government tariff...