Showing 851 - 860 of 908
En este trabajo se presenta una primera estimación del impacto de la reforma del sistema de pensiones acordada por el Gobierno y los agentes sociales en enero de 2011. Tras actualizar las proyecciones de gasto en pensiones realizadas por de la Fuente y Doménech (2009) para el período 2008-60,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008871270
We consider situations in which agents are not able to completely distinguish between all alternatives. Preferences respect individual objective indifferences if any two alternatives are indifferent whenever an agent cannot distinguish between them. We present necessary and sufficient conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584601
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584602
This paper is the first to use a randomized trial in the US to analyze the short- and long- term impacts of an afterschool program that offered disadvantaged high-school youth: mentoring, educational services, and financial rewards to attend program activities, complete high-school and enroll in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584603
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584604
I present a general theorem on preference aggregation. This theorem implies, as corollaries, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Wilson's extension of Arrow's to non-Paretian aggregation rules, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and Sen's result on the Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. The theorem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584605
We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584606
We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584607
This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584608
The rule of k names can be described as follows: given a set of candidates for office, a committee chooses k members from this set by voting, and makes a list with their names. Then a single individual from outside the committee selects one of the listed names for the office. Different variants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584609