We experimentally investigate the effects of a supervisor's reward power on teammates' self-reported effort information and on team performance. When reporting, teammates exaggerate their own efforts, i.e., they lie. However, they do so less if the supervisor has the power to allocate individual...

Spanish Abstract: Esta investigación analiza con un diseño cuantitativo correlacional la influencia del comportamiento del líder en el desarrollo de los recursos humanos en las pyme de México. Para realizar el análisis, se utilize el Modelo de Liderazgo Orientado al apoyo y crecimiento....

Researchers in academia typically perform different tasks: research, teaching and services to the scientific community. We analyze the opportunity costs in terms of a potentially reduced publication productivity associated with becoming a dean in the German institutional setting where deans are...

Traditionally female-dominated sectors are growing and male-dominated ones shrinking, yet sectorial male shares are not changing. Why? I embed a field experiment within the UK national recruitment program for social workers to analyse barriers to men's entry and the nature of men's sorting into...

What determines firm growth over the life-cycle? Exploiting unique firm panel data on internal organization, balance sheets and innovation, representative of the entire Canadian economy, we study recent theories that examine life-cycle patterns for firm growth. These theories include...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

Economists seeking to improve the efficiency of health care delivery frequently emphasize two issues: the fragmented structure of physician practices and poorly designed physician incentives. This paper analyzes these issues from the perspective of organizational economics. We begin with a brief...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

Human capital has often been discussed in transaction cost economics, particularly in connection with understanding the employment relation. This chapter reviews Williamson's thinking on the issue, explains how it differs from Coase and Simon's, and briefly discusses the relevant empirical...

"Evaluitis" - i.e. ex post assessments of organizations and persons - has become a rapidly spreading disease. In addition to the well-known costs imposed on evaluees and evaluators, additional significant costs are commonly disregarded: incentives are distorted, ossification is induced and the...