In a recurring game, a stage game is played consecutively by different groups of players, with each group receiving information about the play of earlier groups. Starting with uncertainty about the distribution of types in the population, late groups may learn to play a correct Bayesian...

Tennenholtz (GEB 2004) developed Program Equilibrium to model play in a finite two-player game where each player can base their strategy on the other player's strategies. Tennenholtz's model allowed each player to produce a "loop-free" computer program that had access to the code for both...

This paper develops theoretical foundations for an error analysis of approximate equilibria in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial markets. While there are several algorithms which compute prices and allocations for which agents' first...

In this paper I consider a dynamically complete market model without intrinsic uncertainty. The only uncertainty is modelled by sunspots. Agents' beliefs are heterogeneous, but eventually become homogeneous in the sense that agents' beliefs are identical in the limit. I show that if some states...

The paper provides an axiomatization of linear inequality measures as a representation of a binary relation on the subspace of income profiles having the same total income. Interpreting the binary relation as a preferences (of, say, a policymaker), we extend the axioms to the whole space of...

We show that any correlation device with rational coefficients can be generated by a mechanism where each player sends a private message to a mediator who in turn makes a public deterministic announcement. Moreover, the mechanism suggested is immunized against individual deviations.