A population of players of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes in the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences....

In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are incomplete as descriptions of the players’ information for the purposes of determining a player’s behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of solution concepts. We then investigate what is...

In repeated games, simple strategies such as Grim Trigger, while strict equilibria when monitoring is perfect, can fail to be even approximate Nash equilibria when monitoring is private, yet arbitrarily close to perfect. That is, they fail to be robust to private monitoring. In this paper, it is...

We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff...

We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...

Consider an agent (manager, artist, etc.) who has imperfect private information about his productivity. At the beginning of his career (period 1, short run"), the agent chooses among publicly observable actions that generate imperfect signals of his productivity. The actions can be ranked...