In games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously and non-cooperatively with the same agent, standard direct revelation mechanisms in which the agent reports his type(i.e. his exogenous private information) have been proven inadequate to characterize the entire set of equilibrium...

In this note we show that even if after default a sovereign can make deposits on a Swiss bank account, the exclusion from future debt is sufficient to deter a patient country from default. In contrast to the work by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) we assume that there is a fixed set of standard assets...

We study the relationship between a player’s (stage game) minmax payoff and the individually rational payoff in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. We characterize the signal structures under which these two payoffs coincide for any payoff matrix. Under a full rank assumption, we further...

Since campaign finance reform is usually motivated by the concern that existing legislation can not effectively prevent campaign contributions to ‘buy favors’, this paper assumes that contributions influence political decisions. But, given that it is also widely recognized that interest...

This paper examines the ability of a policy maker to control equilibrium outcomes in a global coordination game; applications include currency attacks, bank runs, and debt crises. A unique equilibrium is known to survive when the policy is exogenously fixed. We show that, by conveying...

We consider an example of a Markov game with lack of information on one side, that was first introduced by Renault (2002). We compute both the value and optimal strategies for a range of parameter values.