The purpose of this paper is ti develop the theory of the firm to get better understanding of situations in which individual employees enjoy some bargaining power in their relations with the firm, and in which the terms of employment are determined and adjusted through individual contracting and...

For a steady state to be a Nash equilibrium the agents have to perfectly observe the actions of others. This paper suggests a solution concept for cases where players observe only an imperfect signal of what the others' actions are. The model is enriched by specifying the signal that each player...

Let Gamma be a game in extensive form and G be its reduced normal form game. Let Gamma ^infinity (delta) and G^infinity (delta) be the infinitely repeated game version of Gamma and G respectively, with common discount factor delta. This note points out that the set of SPE payoff vectors of...

This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated product industries under conditions of incomplete information. The regulator can control the prices, and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control effectivelythe quality choices of the firms. We inquire about the optimal...

The basic intuition that motivates this paper is that the presence of non-maximizing agents creates incentives for maximizing agents to take advantage of them, and when "frictions" are sufficiently small, these incentives might translate seemingly small deviations from maximizing behavior into...

This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated product industries. The regulator can control the prices, and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control effectively the quality choices of the firms. We inquire about the optimal choice of regulatory regime--whether and...