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Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection
Blouin, Max R. - In: Economic Theory 22 (2003) 2, pp. 245-262
This paper deals with trade volume and distribution of surplus in markets subject to adverse selection. In a model where two qualities of a good exist, I show that if trade is decentralized (i.e. conducted via random pairwise meetings of agents), then all units of the good are traded, and all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597877
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A Scent of Lemon—Seller Meets Buyer with a Noisy Quality Observation
Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 163-186
We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private … standard models of lemons markets, to being perfectly informative. We show that high quality units are sold with positive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009025199
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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2011
-value goods (lemons). We investigate the consequences of this inverse adverse selection and its potential solutions. The … uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the good he purchased; instead, the uninformed … the lemons problem often ineffective in the gems case. We further explore the theoretical and practical appeal of m arket …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325638
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Prices and quality signals
Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - 2004
We consider a market-for-lemons model where the seller is a price setter, and, in addition to observing the price, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281308
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Inverse adverse selection : the market for gems
Dari Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - 2010
-value goods (lemons). We investigate the consequences of this inverse adverse selection and its potential solutions. The … uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the good he purchased; instead, the uninformed … the lemons problem often ineffective in the gems case. We further explore the theoretical and practical appeal of m arket …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382752
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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011
-value goods (lemons). We investigate the consequences of this inverse adverse selection and its potential solutions. The … uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the good he purchased; instead, the uninformed … the lemons problem often ineffective in the gems case. We further explore the theoretical and practical appeal of m arket …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256127
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Prices and quality signals
Voorneveld, Mark; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2004
We consider a market-for-lemons model where the seller is a price setter, and, in addition to observing the price, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649402
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Inverse Adverse Selection: The Market for Gems
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe; Onderstal, Sander; Parisi, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2011
-value goods (lemons). We investigate the consequences of this inverse adverse selection and its potential solutions. The … uninformed buyer in a traditional market for lemons experiences the quality of the good he purchased; instead, the uninformed … the lemons problem often ineffective in the gems case. We further explore the theoretical and practical appeal of m arket …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838639
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Adverse selection, heterogeneous beliefs, and evolutionary learning
Buchen, Clemens; Palermo, Alberto - 2021
We relax the common assumption of homogeneous beliefs in principal-agent relationships with adverse selection. Principals are competitors in the product market and write contracts also on the base of an expected aggregate. The model is a version of a cobweb model. In an evolutionary learning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012607986
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When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
Major, Iván - 2013
Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955