In this paper, a notion of risk measure is defined for dynamic models. Three axioms, coherence, relevance and dynamic consistence, are postulated. It is shown that every dynamic risk measure that satisfies the axioms can be represented as the maximal expected present value of future losses where...

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted...

The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one...

The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same time achieved a more competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and presents a game theoretic explanation of observed...

The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation...

In this paper, we provide an axiomatic approach to general premium priciples giving rise to a decomposition into risk, as a generalization of the expected value, and deviation, as a generalization of the variance. We show that, for every premium priciple, there exists a maximal risk measure...