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Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits

Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - CESifo - 2009

Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979416

Information Aggregation and Efficiency in Agency Contracts with Endogenous Externality

Ishiguro, Shingo - Econometric Society - 2004

In this paper we investigate the principal-multi agent relationship with moral hazard where a risk neutral principal contracts with multiple risk averse agents whose actions are unobservable to the principal. We show that the well--known trade--off between incentive and risk sharing can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063623

Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits in a Globalized World

Helm, Carsten; Demougin, Dominique - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Carl von Ossietzky … - 2012

Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyse this issue in a principal-agent model, higher level of unemployment benefits improves the workers' position in wage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010663615

Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard

Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - In: European Economic Review 55 (2011) 7, pp. 964-979

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573239

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003114944

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa (contributor); Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003011512

Division of Labour and Directed Production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318387

On the sorting of physicians across medical occupations

Courty, Pascal (contributor); Marschke, Gerald (contributor) - 2008

medical specialization. -- Performance measurement ; moral hazard ; incentives ; matching ; pre-matching investment ; career … choice ; medical specialization …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782448

The impact of incentive pay on corporate crime

Herold, Daniel - 2017

This paper presents a moral hazard model analyzing the agent's incentive to commit corporate crime. The principal can only observe profits which the agent can increase by committing crime or exerting effort. It is shown how different incentive contracts, i.e., thresholdlinear, capped bonus and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011773464

Bank Sectoral Specialization and Loan Pricing : Worldwide-Based Syndicated Loan Portfolios

Hsieh, Alice; Yu, Hai-Chin - 2023

episodes of bank specialization. We use the banks’ real loan allocation worldwide instead of the in-sample data to compute a … bank specialization. We find that firms borrowing from banks with high specialization levels incur lower bank loan spreads … specialized. These findings are robust to using entropy as an alternative specialization measure and incremental to the effects by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254329