In this paper, we analyse the short-term wealth effects of large (intra)European takeover bids. We find large announcement effects of 9% for target firms and a cumulative abnormal return that includes the price run-up over the two-month period prior to the announcement date of 23%. However, the...

We analyse why the control of listed German and UK companies is so different. As shareholders in Germany are less protected and control is less expensive, German investors prefer controlling stakes. We also focus on economic factors such as profitability, risk and growth to predict the...

In this paper, we analyse the short-term wealth effects of large (intra) European takeover bids. We find large announcement effects of 9% for target firms, but the cumulative abnormal return that includes the price run-up over the two-week period prior to the event rises to 20%. The share price...

German firms pay out a lower proportion of their cash flows than UK and US firms. However, on a published profits basis, the pattern is reversed. Company law provisions and accounting policies account for these conflicting results. A partial adjustment model is used to estimate the implicit...

This paper investigates whether shareholder lockup agreements in France and Germany mitigate problems of agency and asymmetric information. Despite minimum requirements in terms of the length and percentage of shares locked up, lockup agreements are not only highly diverse across firms but also...

Dividends of German firms are often perceived to be more flexible than those of Anglo-American firms. We analyse the decision to change the dividend for 221 German firms over 1984-93. Consistent with Lintner (1956), net earnings are key determinants of dividend changes. However, our findings...

In this paper, we analyse the short-term wealth effects of large (intra) European takeover bids. We find large announcement effects of 9% for target firms, but the cumulative abnormal return that includes the price run-up over the two-week period prior to the event rises to 20%. The share price...

Who disciplines management of poorly performing firms? Four parties are considered: existing holders of large blocks of shares, investors acquiring new shareholdings, creditors and non-executive directors. This paper reports a comparative evaluation of the role of all four parties using a large...

To the opposite of most Continental European countries, the UK has had stringent rules on ownership disclosure for more than 50 years. However, despite this, we show that the corporate governance system in the UK still needs be improved. The way ownership of listed companies is concentrated in...

This paper analyses the control of Belgian listed companies. The analysis reveals that control of listed companies in Belgium is highly concentrated. Business groups, holding companies, and voting pacts, play an important role in bringing about this concentration. The main characteristics of the...