We propose an evolutionary metaheuristic for approximating the preference-nondominated solutions of a decision maker in multiobjective combinatorial problems. The method starts out with some partial preference information provided by the decision maker, and utilizes an individualized fitness...

For young technology firms, acquiring resources can often be costly die to the information asymmetry and uncertainty that exist surrounding the new technology. We contend that managers of technology companies use signals strategically as a potent tool for mobilizing necessary resources. We...

This paper examines the feasibility of collusion in capacity constrained duopoly supergames. In each period firms simultaneously set a price-quantity pair specifying the price for the period and the maximum quantity the firm is willing to sell as this price. Under price-quantity competition...

The role of open market operations - exchanges of different classes of government liabilities between the government and private sector - are considered in an oft-studied dynamic equilibrium model with money. Open market operation-financed changes in the money supply may have different...

This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson’s (1993) model of redistributive politics. Regardless of the absolute levels of the efficiency of political parties’ transfers to different voter segments, parties have incentive to (stochastically) shift resources away...

We compare trading costs in the transparent U.S. Treasury bond market with the less transparent U.S. corporate and municipal bond markets, based on newly available transaction data. We estimate that the mean bid-ask spread per $100 par value is 23 cents for municipal bonds, 21 cents for...

The paper studies efficient risk sharing under limited enforcement (or "limited commitment") constraints determined by the threat of punishment after misbehavior. As in Kocherlakota (1996), I assume that society chooses from among those allocations implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium....

We study equilibrium prices and trade volume with n identical buyers and a seller who initially commits to some capacity. Sales are sequential and each price is determined by strategic bargaining. A unique sub-game perfect equilibrium exists. It is characterized by absence of costly bargaining...