Consumer Antitrust Studies at Loyola University Chicago. All are short, none are deeply analytical. A couple of the books … discussed were published in 2008, but I did not get around to reviewing them until at least 2009. Review of notable antitrust … addresses different needs of the academic and practicing bar, and even includes a book or two of general interest to antitrust …

implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such games. In our treatments without communication, players fail to cooperate and … essentially play the static Nash equilibrium (consistent with previous results). With communication, inefficient firms gain at the …

firms. Communication is often abused for explicit agreements and this strongly reduces competition. …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports fims in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …

implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such games. In our treatments without communication, players fail to cooperate and … essentially play the static Nash equilibrium (consistent with previous results). With communication, inefficient firms gain at the …

implicitly and explicitly), if at all, in such games. We find that, without communication, players fail to cooperate and … essentially play the static Nash equilibrium, confirming previous results. With communication, inefficient firms gain at the …

We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in … largest additional profit from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is … disabled. Communication supports fims in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation. …