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Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness
Schipper, Burkhard - 2021
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are ''self-destroying'' as a player's representation of the game may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012655887
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Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
Schipper, Burkhard - 2021
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are "self-destroying" as a player's representation of the game may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012509154
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Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
Heinemann, Frank; Nagel, Rosemarie; Ockenfels, Peter - 2004
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333857
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Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games
Heinemann, Frank; Nagel, Rosemarie; Ockenfels, Peter - 2004
This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361993
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Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games
Heinemann, Frank; Nagel, Rosemarie; Ockenfels, Peter - 2004
This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects? certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261109
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Credible Forward Commitments and Risk-Sharing Equilibria
Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2007
It is shown that risk-sharing examined in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) has a perfect Nash equilibrium, which is unique, incentive-efficient and continuous in all parameters of the economy. Competition in individual markets of a perfectly competitive economy is generally imperfect and allows...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012731746
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Trust, Reciprocity, and Betrayal Aversion : Theoretical and Experimental Insights
Breuer, Wolfgang - 2014
We propose that there are three determinants of sender behavior in trust games: Beliefs re-garding the amounts returned, risk aversion, and reciprocity. Particularly, we are interested in the role of reciprocity because the possibility of negative expected reciprocal utility may lead to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056469
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Fragments on the 'Swan' - Money, Credit and Finance in 'The Arcades Project' of Walter Benjamin
Estrada, Fernando - 2010
The main objective of this paper is to present a reading of The Arcades Project by Walter Benjamin in the context of the financial crisis, in particular, reflect from a few fragments of Benjamin's work appear to lie around a Black Swan. The recovery of the fragments of The Arcades seems...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144689
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Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
Heinemann, Frank; Nagel, Rosemarie; Ockenfels, Peter - 2021
This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment, we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318801
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Categorizing Others in a Large Game
Azrieli, Yaron - 2009
the context of a large normal form game. Every agent has a categorization (partition) of her opponents and can only … to a given categorization profile if every player's strategy is a best response to some consistent conjecture about the … strategies of her opponents. We show that, for a wide family of games and for a particular categorization profile, every CCE …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049187