This paper presents an experiment to test effects of sequential entry on stability of collusion in oligopoly markets …. Previous research suggests that the larger the number of firms, the harder it is to sustain collusion. We find that when groups … start off small and the entrant is informed about the history of her group, collusion is easier to sustain than in groups …

. We review previous Cournot experiments in the literature. Additionally, we conduct a new series of experiments studying … oligopolies with two, three, four, and five firms in a unified frame. With two firms we find some collusion. Three …

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple … collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a … short run increase in collusion. However, in a limited message-space treatment where subjects cannot communicate contingent …

the structures of this market for which an entry threat facilitates collusion between incumbents. While the entry threat … leaves collusion and deviation profits unchanged, it lowers profits in punishment periods. Consequently, an entry threat …We analyse the impact of an entry threat at the downstream level on the ability of a pair of vertically integrated …

, limited to one entrant per period, or subject to an entry exam. We include two additional treatments that combine the two …

, using a laboratory experiment, the effectiveness of two regularly-employed entry restrictions: entry quotas and entry exams … entry exam. We find both kinds of restrictions improve the efficient integration of entrants, but that there is no …

, limited to one entrant per period, or subject to an entry exam. We include two additional treatments that combine the two …

, limited to one entrant per period, or subject to an entry exam. We include two additional treatments that combine the two …

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments … vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the … amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases …

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments … vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the … amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases …