This paper provides a TU < alpha >-core existence result in a large class of normal form games. In the oligopoly markets of a homogeneous good, the TU < alpha >-core is non-empty if all profit functions are continuous and concave. In a general game, the existence of TU < alpha >-core follows from the weak separability,...</alpha></alpha></alpha>

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition's payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then...

This paper provides existence results for a large class of covertly collusive outcomes in oligopoly markets. In particular, the paper shows that the Alpha-core is non-empty in linear industries with any asymmetric costs and any asymmetric capacity bounds

Though the envelope theorem is a widely used tool of applied economic analysis, the standard version of the theorem can only be used if all of the choice variables are assumed to be continuous. This limitation is significant because the natural description of many economic choice variables is as...

A specific structure is added to the model of Bayesian society, and the associated (more involved) version of the Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium concept is proposed. The equilibrium endogenously explains whether or not player j in coalition S, in pursuit of his self-interest,...