We study the relationship between voters' preferences and the emergence of party platforms in two-party democratic elections with adaptive parties. In the model, preferences of voters and the opposition party's platform determine an electoral landscape on which the challenging party must...

We construct a computational model of Tiebout competition. We show that the notion that Tiebout competition, as a result of enforcing efficiency, renders institutional arrangements unimportant does not preclude the possibility that political institutions may differ in their ability to sort...

We study the relationship between voters' preferences and the composition of party platforms in two-party democratic elections with adaptive parties. In the model, a political party locally adapts a platform on an electoral landscape. The electoral landscape is determined by the preferences of...

In this paper, we address the use of adaptive computational modeling techniques in the field of political economy. The introduction considers the advantages of computational methods. The bulk of the paper describe two computational models: a spatial model of electoral competition and a Tiebout...

In this paper, we construct a computational model of Tiebout competition. We show that the notion that Tiebout competition, as a result of enforcing efficiency, renders institutional arrangements unimportant does not preclude the possibility that political institutions may differ in their...